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Abstract
Th is paper undertakes an analysis of South Africa’s applica-
tion of the OAU Convention’s expanded refugee defi nition. 
It fi nds that in the fi rst stage of South Africa’s refugee status 
determination process, government offi  cials tasked with in-
dividually determining refugee status seemingly make use of 
the OAU Convention’s refugee defi nition and basic country 
of origin information in a unique form of prima facie refugee 
determination. In this regard, improved training of offi  cials 
is essential in order to ensure that the appropriate level of 
protection to all asylum seekers is aff orded in terms of the 
defi nition. At the South African Refugee Appeal Board level, 
however, due to the in-depth nature of the decisions rendered, 
the OAU refugee defi nition is more correctly, yet cautiously, 
utilized to provide protection to persons fl eeing indiscrim-
inate widespread disruption of public order or generalized 
violence. Th is research is the fi rst of its kind to analyze select 
decisions of the South African Refugee Appeal Board.
Résumé
Cet article entreprend une analyse sur la façon dont la dé-
fi nition élargie de réfugié proposée par la Convention de 
l’OUA est appliquée par l’Afrique du Sud. Il conclut qu’au 
premier stade de la procédure Sud africaine de détermina-
tion du statut de réfugié, les responsables gouvernementaux 
chargés de la détermination du statut de réfugié au niveau 
individuel semblent utiliser la défi nition de réfugié conte-
nue dans la Convention de l’OUA ainsi que l’information 
de base sur le pays d’origine pour faire une détermination 
prima facie, unique en son genre, du statut de réfugié. À cet 
égard, il est impératif que les responsables gouvernementaux 
reçoivent une meilleure formation afi n d’assurer un niveau 
de protection approprié à tous les réfugiés en ce qu’il s’agit 
de la défi nition. Cependant, au niveau du South African 
Refugee Appeal Board (la Commission d’appel des réfugiés 
de l’Afrique du Sud), vu la nature approfondie des décisions 
rendues, la défi nition de réfugié de l’OUA est plus correc-
tement — mais aussi prudemment — utilisée pour fournir 
une protection aux personnes qui fuient des perturbations 
étendues et indiscriminées de l’ordre public, ou la violence 
généralisée. Cette étude est la première en son genre à ana-
lyser des décisions sélectionnées du South African Refugee 
Appeal Board (la Commission d’appel des réfugiés de l’Afri-
que du Sud).
Introduction
Th e 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specifi c Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa1 (OAU Convention) is, to date, 
the only legally binding regional refugee treaty and is re-
garded as a “cornerstone of refugee protection in Africa.2 
Nearly forty years on, the OAU Convention remains an es-
sential means of providing protection to large numbers of 
persons who are forced to fl ee their countries of origin due 
to indiscriminate widespread disruption of public order or 
generalized violence, with its most celebrated feature being 
the expansion of the refugee defi nition3 to provide protec-
tion to such persons.
South Africa’s refugee protection system is still in its 
nascent stage of development, having only commenced 
aft er the demise of Apartheid regime in the mid 1990s. In 
1995 and 1996 respectively, South Africa signed the OAU 
Convention and the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Refugee Convention).4 Shortly thereaft er, South 
Africa enacted its Refugees Act 130 of 1998, which became 
operational in the year 2000. Th e Refugees Act incorporates 
both the 1951 Convention and OAU Convention refugee 
defi nitions, thus providing for expanded refugee protection 
in the Republic.5
Th e OAU refugee defi nition and the OAU Convention as 
a whole have not been subject to much interrogation; neither 
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have they been the subject of much international jurispru-
dence. Similarly, South Africa’s analysis of the OAU refugee 
defi nition has been less than noteworthy. To date, there exist 
no published Refugee Appeal Board decisions, or reported 
or unreported South African High Court decisions that have 
interpreted the OAU refugee defi nition. In general, refugee 
law jurisprudence in South Africa is thin, save for a number 
of cases related mainly to asylum procedure. Moreover, reli-
able statistics from the South African Department of Home 
Aff airs or other sources, which may detail the extent of the 
application of the OAU refugee defi nition in practice, are not 
readily available, if not non-existent.
In analyzing some of the key elements of the OAU refugee 
defi nition as well as the approach to refugee determination in 
the country, this paper will attempt to ascertain whether, in 
the South African context, the expanded refugee defi nition 
is providing the necessary protection to certain individuals, 
as envisaged by the OAU Convention. A detailed analysis of 
selected Refugee Appeal Board decisions on topic will assist 
in determining the current level of protection aff orded by the 
South African refugee regime in this regard.
South Africa’s Refugee Determination Process 
and the OAU Defi nition: A Form of Prima Facie 
Refugee Status Determination?
At the outset, it is necessary to determine to whom the OAU 
refugee defi nition specifi cally applies. Th is question arises 
because of the defi nition’s words “every person,” which need 
to be considered. According to Micah Rankin, some African 
States view the OAU refugee defi nition as applying only to 
Africans. Th e basis for this position may possibly be found 
in the Convention’s main objective, that as a regional com-
plement to the Refugee Convention, it was created in order 
to meet the specifi c needs of African refugees, which may 
suggest an intention on the part of its draft ers to limit its 
territorial application to Africa.6 However, the plain mean-
ing of the words “every person” clearly points to a more 
inclusive interpretation, meaning that the defi nition’s ap-
plication ought to be universal. Furthermore, the Refugee 
Convention’s universal application, stemming from the same 
inclusive wording, provides evidence of the requirement of 
similar application. Th is broader line of interpretation is also 
more consistent with the expanded defi nition’s aim to extend 
asylum rather than to refuse it.7 Notwithstanding this point, 
the actual position that the South African government takes 
in relation to the scope of the OAU refugee defi nition is what 
remains relevant to the within study. In this regard, it is ne-
cessary to examine what transpires in South Africa’s refugee 
determination procedure.
In South Africa, it is the responsibility of the Department 
of Home Aff airs (the Department) to determine the status 
of refugees. Th is is done by way of a status interview con-
ducted by a Department offi  cial, known as a Refugee Status 
Determination Offi  cer (RSDO). A rejected asylum seeker 
has the right to review of the RSDO’s decision by the Refugee 
Appeal Board or by the Standing Committee for Refugee 
Aff airs, two quasi-judicial tribunals created in terms of the 
Refugees Act.
While the Refugees Act provides for special measures or 
powers of the Minister of Home Aff airs to be taken in times 
of a mass infl ux of refugees into the country,8 it was antici-
pated and in fact legislated that, in the normal course, at 
fi rst instance each asylum seeker in South Africa receives an 
individual refugee status determination. However, research 
indicates that in South Africa the individual process of refu-
gee status determination improperly makes use of the OAU 
refugee defi nition in a unique form of prima facie refugee 
determination,9 which is a process normally used in times of 
mass infl ux or emergency. Th is is because
it appears that South Africa applies a form of prima facie asylum 
determination that is not related to a mass-infl ux situation, but 
rather depends on whether it is “obvious” than an applicant is a 
refugee, based on the danger and instability within a part of the 
applicant’s country of origin.10
Ingrid van Beek explains this point further by asserting 
that in South Africa “there is not only a mixed understand-
ing of the defi nition of ‘prima facie refugees’ … but on what 
is perceived as a mass infl ux situation.”11 Van Beek’s research 
included interviews with Department offi  cials, who stat-
ed that South Africa was experiencing a situation of mass 
infl ux as determined by reference to the actual number of 
asylum seekers that were entering the country. Interestingly, 
several years later, in a recent report by the Refugee Aff airs 
Directorate, Department of Home Aff airs, this very same 
conclusion is echoed. Refugee Aff airs, throughout its 2006 
Annual Report on Asylum Statistics, concludes that South 
Africa is still experiencing a mass infl ux of asylum seekers 
into the country.12
In this regard, there is a clear inconsistency that exists in 
terms of the legislative intent of the Refugees Act as compared 
to the actual understanding and practice of Department of-
fi cials at the refugee reception offi  ces. More specifi cally, the 
Department is on one hand stating that there is a mass infl ux of 
asylum seekers into the country, thereby legitimizing its use of 
the OAU refugee defi nition in order to fast-track refugee status 
determinations. However, on the other hand, the Minister has 
never implemented the special provisions, in terms of her pow-
ers under section 35 of the Refugees Act, to deal with a mass 
infl ux of asylum seekers into the country, if such was really 
the case. Th e special provisions that the Minister may invoke 
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include the accommodation of any specifi c category or group 
of asylum seekers or refugees in camps or refugee reception 
centres. To add to the confusion, nowhere in the Refugees Act 
is the term “mass infl ux” actually defi ned.
Th erefore, while there is no offi  cial mass infl ux into South 
Africa at this time, it seems that the Department’s approach 
to refugee status determination in fact relies on the applica-
tion of the OAU refugee defi nition to assist in accelerating or 
fast-tracking applications based on a prima facie recognition 
of refugee status. Th is can likely be explained as a result of the 
endemic resource and capacity shortages at the Department 
of Home Aff airs, Refugee Aff airs Directorate,13 which “pose 
serious challenges for Refugee Aff airs … and have over-
whelmed the already fragile refugee services.”14
Anais Tuepker comments that, in the process of fast-
tracking applications within South Africa’s refugee status de-
termination procedure, which includes the use of unoffi  cial 
or non-legislated practices such as pre-screening process-
es,15 reliance on implicit “white lists” of refugee producing 
countries, and the focus on merely confi rming the national-
ity of an asylum seeker, indicates that the “institutional cul-
ture [among the Department] overwhelmingly supports an 
automatic link between nationality and refugeehood which 
produces the shared knowledge that asylum is only really for 
a select group of nationals.”16
In terms of RSDOs’ focusing on the nationality of an asy-
lum seeker, Lee Anne de la Hunt describes the following 
practice in more detail as follows:
While the Department of Home Aff airs denies keeping a list of 
“refugee producing countries” or a “white list” there is clearly a 
mindset or institutional culture within the department that de-
termines who is a refugee and who is not, based on the asylum 
seeker’s country of origin. Th e focus of this country-oriented ap-
proach is that, particularly in relation to countries whose nation-
als are very likely to be granted asylum (Somalia, for example), 
the focus of the determination hearing is on getting the asylum 
seeker to “prove” his or her nationality on the basis of his or her 
knowledge of demographics, culture and language, geography 
and the political landscape.17
Th e aforementioned practices relied upon by Department 
offi  cials are evidenced by the fact that the majority of rec-
ognized refugees in South Africa “are from countries in 
Africa where civil, generalized confl ict and the breakdown 
of public order are endemic.”18 De la Hunt surmises that the 
Department’s acceptance rates fl uctuate depending on the 
government’s assessment of the situation in the countries 
from which the asylum seekers hail.19 She further reasons 
that the high acceptance rates from these countries are made 
on the basis of the OAU refugee defi nition, in that:
… the letters advising refugees that their asylum claims have 
been successful merely state this fact …. [while] most of the re-
jection letters start by declaring that the asylum seeker has failed 
to prove that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution, 
but then go on to give a (usually standardized) assessment of 
the situation within the country of origin (for example, that the 
country of origin is a democracy that protects its citizens) with 
very little analysis, of the actual claim itself, or its merits.20
Th e year-on-year increase in the number of asylum seek-
ers arriving in South Africa undoubtedly places a burden on 
the already strained refugee services in the country. To some 
extent therefore it is understandable that “at least implicitly … 
Home Aff airs offi  cials prefer easy acceptances on the basis of 
the OAU defi nition; it also appears, however, that they do not 
deal satisfactorily with claims arising from the Convention’s 
narrower defi nition based on a persecution standard.”21
As a consequence of the Department’s approach that the 
OAU defi nition patently supports the notion of refugee-
generating countries, there appears to be another disturb-
ing practice amongst the Department’s offi  cials, related to 
the limiting of the number of applicants who can apply for 
asylum. Many asylum seekers are simply refused entrance to 
the refugee reception offi  ces. For the most part, this practice 
is recognizably arbitrary and based on the large numbers of 
asylum seekers that queue outside the offi  ces each day,22 but 
it may also be on account of an applicant’s nationality. In this 
regard, the following specifi c examples come to mind. Two 
particular clients at the author’s offi  ce, one of Nepalese na-
tionality and the other from Fiji, were time and again denied 
access to the Cape Town Refugee Reception Offi  ce, having 
been advised by Home Aff airs offi  cials that Nepal and Fiji are 
“safe countries” and that they therefore could not be asylum 
seekers.
According to the above, therefore, it would seem as if at 
fi rst instance, i.e. at the RSDO interview level, the OAU refu-
gee defi nition or section 3(b) of the Refugees Act is in fact 
only applied to African asylum seekers. Tuepker confi rmed 
this fact in an interview she conducted with an offi  cial of the 
Department of Home Aff airs: Head Offi  ce.23 Furthermore, L. 
de la Hunt concludes that “both the [Department of Home 
Aff airs asylum] statistics themselves, as well as conversations 
with Home Aff airs offi  cials, indicate that the benefi ts of the 
extended defi nition are only available to African refugees.”24
Aside from the fact that the legislative framework for 
refugee status determination in South Africa does not pro-
vide for the type of prima facie refugee status determination 
which has clearly emerged, another particular problem that 
may arise with the use of such a practice is that such refugee 
status determinations fail to recognize that some applicants 
from “refugee-generating” countries may also have individ-
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ualized refugee claims or, in other words, a well-founded 
fear of persecution. Ignoring this fact, or not providing each 
asylum seeker with the opportunity to fully explain, in a for-
mal application process, his or her individualized reasons for 
fl eeing his or her country, may have a negative eff ect on that 
refugee later on if or when the Department decides to invoke 
cessation of the refugee’s status, based on the fact that the 
presumed conditions which caused the refugee to fl ee cease 
to exist.25
Th e Position of the Refugee Appeal Board
According to the author’s experience and as per the literature 
reviewed, the fi rst-instance RSDO decisions in South Africa’s 
asylum process are generally of such poor quality that a 
specifi c determination as to their application of the OAU 
defi nition cannot be properly gleaned. In this regard, the 
RSDOs’ decisions granting an applicant refugee status do not 
provide reasons for same, for example, whether the applicant 
was approved in terms of a particular section of the Refugees 
Act. Rather, such decisions simply state “ … [T]he applica-
tion for asylum in respect of yourself has been approved … 
and your formal recognition of refugee status is hereby at-
tached.”26 Furthermore, while decisions rejecting an asylum 
seeker’s application must set out reasons for same, they usu-
ally only set out the applicant’s claim in a short paragraph, 
and then proceed to reject the claim based on reasons to the 
eff ect that the applicant could not establish a well-founded 
fear of persecution. Th e lack of suffi  cient and/or continuous 
training of RSDOs, as well as lack of adequate resources to 
conduct country-of-origin research, likely accounts for the 
poor quality of these decisions.
It is therefore necessary to examine the decisions of the 
Refugee Appeal Board, which are generally more detailed, 
including a thorough review of the appellant’s refugee claim, 
up-to-date country-of-origin information and international 
jurisprudence, used to accept or reject an appellant’s claim. 
Th e Refugee Appeal Board has itself on numerous occasions 
acknowledged the poor quality of the RSDO’s decisions; i.e., 
rather than conducting an appeal in the true sense,27 the 
Refugee Appeal Board deems its hearings to be de novo hear-
ings in which the Board in eff ect conducts a fresh refugee 
status determination hearing with the appellant.28
Unfortunately, to date, the Refugee Appeal Board has of-
fi cially made public only two of its decisions,29 which makes 
it very diffi  cult to properly ascertain or determine its juris-
prudence. Fortunately, despite the dearth of appeal decisions 
made available at this time, through her many interactions 
with the Refugee Appeal Board in the course of her em-
ployment, the author has been able to pose questions of the 
Appeal Board members in an attempt to better understand its 
interpretation of the OAU defi nition. In terms of the scope of 
application of the Refugees Act section 3(b), in other words 
whether the OAU defi nition applies to every person or only 
to every African, the Chairperson of the Refugee Appeal 
Board responded to the author’s question as follows:
… [T]he Board would apply [Section 3(b) of the Refugees Act] 
to anyone from any part of the world and not only Africans. 
Th e reasons here fore is that when the OAU Convention was 
incorporated into the Refugees Act, it did not specify that it 
would only apply to the African continent but was left  open so 
to speak.30
In terms of the whether the Internal Flight Alternative 
(IFA) may be applied to a person who takes fl ight as a re-
sult of a section 3(b) event, the Chairperson of the Appeal 
Board, on behalf of the Board, advised31 that the Board is 
not wholly in agreement with the position taken by UNHCR 
or James Hathaway, its interpretation being that the IFA 
does not apply, as the defi nition clearly states that the event 
need only take place in either part of the whole of an ap-
plicant’s country of origin or nationality. In this regard, the 
Board is of the opinion that, if possible, an asylum seeker 
needs to have exhausted all internal remedies in his or her 
country of origin, prior to seeking protection abroad. Th is 
is in line with the notion of “surrogate protection,” in which 
the international community is only required by law to pro-
vide asylum when a person’s government is unable to do so 
itself. In this regard, for example, it would not be possible or 
reasonable for a forced migrant from an event seriously dis-
turbing the public order in Goma, in the eastern part of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to be required to 
travel to the very faraway capital city of Kinshasa, whereas 
fl eeing across the border into a neighbouring country is safer 
and more practical. However, if internal fl ight from a loca-
tion in which an OAU event took place to one in which there 
is safety within the country is possible and not unduly diffi  -
cult for the individual, then the Board feels that the IFA issue 
may be raised.
Lastly, with regard to the issue of a whether or not a per-
son may become a sur place refugee according to the OAU 
refugee defi nition, the Chairperson of the Refugee Appeal 
Board stated the following:
… the OAU Convention or section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, 
1998, cannot apply to a sur place case because of the wording of 
the defi nition or section i.e. you must be compelled to leave your 
habitual place of residence … If you were not compelled to leave 
then it cannot apply. However, looking at the wording of section 
2 of the Refugees Act, 1998, read with section 3 of the Act, it is 
clear that a person [fearing a section 3(b) or OAU event] must 
be granted asylum sur place.32
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Some Refugee Appeal Board Decisions Reviewed
According to section 26(1) of the Refugees Act, “any asy-
lum seeker may lodge an appeal with the Appeal Board … 
if the Refugee Status Determination Offi  cer has rejected the 
application in terms of section 2(3)(c),”33 in other words, if 
the RSDO has rejected the application as unfounded. Th is 
automatic right to an appeal eff ectively means another layer 
added to the South African refugee determination proced-
ure, since it is more oft en than not the case that rejected asy-
lum seekers heavily rely on the appeal process for a proper 
decision on their claim and/or merely to prolong their stay 
in the country. Th e immense number of appeal cases already 
heard by the Appeal Board for which decisions are still pend-
ing and those which are scheduled to take place in the future, 
which currently runs well into 2009, is symptomatic of this 
situation.
For this research, the author was only able to obtain a small 
number of appeal decisions from the Refugee Appeal Board. 
In this regard, the Chairperson of the Appeal Board provided 
the author with approximately one hundred random appeal 
decisions, of which only eight decisions dealt with the sec-
tion 3(b) refugee defi nition. Despite the small sample, the 
mere fact that only such a small percentage of appeal board 
decisions raise the section 3(b) defi nition may indicate that 
most of the claims that fall within the ambit of section 3(b) 
are in fact properly adjudicated by RSDOs at fi rst instance. 
Irrespectively, an evaluation of the decisions obtained pro-
vides a picture of the Appeal Board applying the OAU defi n-
ition sensibly, yet at the same time rather cautiously.
Of the Appeal Board decisions obtained, fi ve of them dealt 
with the general application of the section 3(b) defi nition. 
In this regard, rather than analyzing a particular element of 
the defi nition itself, these decisions reviewed the appellant’s 
claim, then reviewed the conditions in the appellant’s coun-
try of origin, and fi nally concluded, based on the situation in 
the appellant’s country of origin, whether or not the asylum 
seeker qualifi ed for refugee status in terms of this defi nition. 
In terms of these decisions, especially those in which the 
Appeal Board upheld the appeal and granted refugee status 
based on the application of section 3(b), the question remains 
as to why the RSDO at fi rst instance did not apply the same 
country of origin research and reasoning to reach the con-
clusion that the asylum seeker must receive refugee protec-
tion. Unfortunately, due to the fact that the Refugee Appeal 
Board deems its hearings to be de novo ones, it is not possible 
when reviewing the Board’s decision to assess the reasoning 
of the RSDO in coming to his or her negative decision at fi rst 
instance for the same applicant. Th e author, however, on a 
number of occasions, has been advised by Department offi  -
cials of the lack of suffi  cient internet facilities, hence country 
of origin research capabilities, of its RSDOs. Th is explanation 
may account for the incorrect application of the OAU defi n-
ition at fi rst instance as offi  cials are unable to properly assess 
the situation in the applicant’s country of origin.
In Refugee Appeal Board decision number 159/2004,34 
the Appeal Board granted refugee status to a Somali na-
tional hailing from the country’s war-ravaged capital city of 
Mogadishu, the appellant’s place of habitual residence. Th e 
appellant’s claim consisted of his fl eeing Mogadishu due to 
generalized life-threatening factional clan fi ghting which 
was occurring throughout the city. In its decision, the Appeal 
Board referred to various 2003 country reports, which con-
fi rm the large number of civilian deaths in the city due to 
the continued fi ghting in the capital city. Interestingly, in 
this case, counsel for the appellant argued that her client 
should be granted refugee status based on an individualized 
or 1951 refugee claim and also argued that the appellant did 
not have an Internal Flight Alternative as he could not fl ee to 
“the northern part of the Somalia because he is from a diff er-
ent clan and will not be accepted there.”35 In this regard, the 
Appeal Board pointed out that counsel erred, as:
… its reasons for not returning the appellant to his country of 
origin falls within the ambit of section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, 
1998, and not as prayed for by Counsel in terms of section 3(a) 
of the Act. Section 3(a) makes it clear that a person must have 
a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a specifi c reason 
mentioned in the section. Th is is not the case with section 3(b) 
where a person is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual 
residence because of, for instance, events seriously disturbing or 
disrupting public order and where persecution as such is not 
necessarily present. In this case, the appellant was compelled to 
leave Somalia because of the faction and clan fi ghting, in other 
words events seriously disturbing and/or disrupting public or-
der, in order to seek refuge elsewhere.36
In another Appeal Board decision of a Somali national, 
the Appeal Board granted refugee status to the appellant who 
hailed from the southern Somali city of Kismayo. Similar to 
the above decision, according to this appellant’s personal 
background it emerged that “nothing has ever happened to 
him personally and that his complaint is based on the on-
going clan-related fi ghting taking place in Kismayo and else-
where in Somalia.”37 Aft er reviewing the appellant’s claim, 
the Appeal Board went on to review a prominent country 
report on the situation in Somalia, which confi rmed that 
the entire southern part of the country remains unstable 
due to chronic lawlessness and insecurity, hence “ … [i]t is 
clear that anyone coming from the southern Somalia, such 
as Kismayo, whether anything has happened to them or not, 
fall within the group of asylum seekers needing international 
protection.”38
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According to the sample of decisions reviewed, it is evi-
dent that the Refugee Appeal Board also dismisses appeals 
on the basis of an analysis of the current conditions of the ap-
pellant’s country of origin. In this regard, the Appeal Board 
uses documentary evidence or country reports to indicate 
that a change in country-of-origin conditions has taken place 
such that it is now, based on a forward-looking defi nition of 
a refugee, considered safe for the asylum seeker to return to 
his country of origin.
It is trite law that the refugee defi nition is a forward-
looking one, meaning that when a decision maker assesses 
whether someone qualifi es for refugee status, he or she must 
determine if the asylum seeker will face persecution upon 
return to their country of origin. Th e Michigan Guidelines 
on Well-Founded Fear39 expand on this point, but specifi c-
ally with regard to the element of fear in the 1951 refugee 
defi nition:
An understanding of “fear” as forward-looking expectation of 
risk is fully justifi ed by one of the plain meanings of the [Refugee 
Convention’s] English text, and is confi rmed by dominant in-
terpretations of the equally authoritative French language text 
(“craignant avec raison”), which do not canvass subjective trepi-
dation. Th is construction avoids the enormous practical risks in-
herent in attempting objectively to assess the feelings and emo-
tions of an applicant. It is moreover consistent with the internal 
structure of the Convention, for example with the principle that 
refugee status ceases when the actual risk of being persecuted 
comes to an end, though not on the basis of an absence of trepi-
dation (Art. 1(C)5–6), and with the fact that the core duty of 
non-refoulement applies where there is a genuine risk of being 
persecuted, with no account taken of whether a refugee stands 
in trepidation of that risk (Art. 33).40
A similar approach, that of a forward looking assessment 
of risk, to refugee determination based on the OAU or sec-
tion 3(b) refugee defi nition, also must take place when the 
RSDO or the Refugee Appeal Board is deciding upon an asy-
lum seeker’s claim. Th is position is also logically consistent 
with the cessation clause found in the Refugees Act, 1998 at 
section 5(1)(e), which provides that a person ceases to qual-
ify for refugee status if “he or she can no longer continue 
to refuse to avail himself or herself of the protection of the 
country of his or her nationality because the circumstances 
in connection with which he or she has been recognized as a 
refugee have ceased to exist.”41 In light of this fact, the Appeal 
Board appropriately assesses the prospective risk of an appel-
lant by evaluating the current conditions in his or her coun-
try of origin.
With the above in mind, an example of the Board’s forward-
looking assessment in terms of sections 3(b) and 5(1)(e) of 
the Refugees Act is found in Appeal Board decision number 
4013/03, in which the Board dismissed the appellant’s claim. 
In this case, which the Appeal Board heard in February 2004, 
the Rwandan national fl ed his country of origin when the 
genocide reached his village in 1994. Th e appellant arrived 
in South Africa in 1995 and, by letter dated 10 September 
1997, the Standing Committee for Refugee Aff airs declined 
to grant him refugee status.42 Once again, it is unclear why 
this decision was taken by the Standing Committee at the 
time, and in this regard, the Appeal Board confi rms that “be-
cause the appeal hearing is a de novo procedure, the appel-
lant does not have to prove that the Standing Committee was 
wrong … [rather] the Board assesses the evidence given by 
the appellant and makes its own decision on the objective 
facts concerned.”43 In any event, in terms of its assessment of 
the appellant’s claim, the Appeal Board had “no hesitation in 
fi nding that section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, 1998, applied 
to the appellant when he initially lodged his application for 
refugee status.”44 However, the Appeal Board’s decision to 
dismiss the claim was based on whether or not “the situation 
in Rwanda has changed to such an extent that it is safe for 
appellant to return there.”45 In this regard, and based on the 
Appeal Board’s review of 2004 and 2005 Rwanda situation 
reports, the Board determined that it would be safe for the 
appellant to return to his country.
Th e above decision brings an important issue to the fore, 
that being the implication of such an extensive delay in the 
decision-making process of the Department of Home Aff airs 
and Refugee Appeal Board. In the case, the appellant arrived 
in South Africa in early 1995 and, ten years later his appeal 
to the Refugee Appeal Board was dismissed, based on a for-
ward-looking assessment of risk. Th is means that while the 
appellant had a genuine refugee-related reason for fl eeing his 
country ten years ago, at present, however, according to the 
Appeal Board, he could safely return there due to the changed 
circumstances in his country of origin. Unfortunately, this 
approach fails to take into consideration the impact of sec-
tion 5(2) of the Refugees Act. Th is section states that ces-
sation of refugee status based on section 5(1)(e) “does not 
apply to a refugee who is able to invoke compelling reasons 
arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail him-
self or herself of the protection of the country of nationality.” 
In the case of Mayongo v. Refugee Appeal Board & Others46 
the South African High Court, in a judicial review applica-
tion of an Appeal Board decision dismissing an appeal of an 
Angolan asylum seeker, dealt with this issue specifi cally and 
granted the applicant refugee status. Th e Court held that
According to the UNCHR handbook a person is a refugee 
as soon as he/she fulfi ls the criteria contained in the defi n-
ition. Th at takes place before he/she applies for refugee status. 
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Recogniblotion of refugee status does not make the person a 
refugee but only declares that he/se is one… . Th e RAB accepted 
that he was compelled to fl ee Angola. It follows that he was a 
refugee at the time. When the RAB dealt with the appeal it did 
not consider the impact of sections 5(1)(e) and 5(2) because the 
applicant never offi  cially obtained refugee status. In that respect 
it made a basic error of law. It was in law compelled to determine 
whether the post-traumatic stress syndrome and major depres-
sive disorder constituted a compelling reason to refuse to avail 
himself of the protection of the Angolan Government.47
In light of this Mayongo decision, the Appeal Board’s de-
cision in the Rwandan national’s case described above may 
contain a similar basic error in law. Th e Board decided that 
the genocide in Rwanda fell within the meaning of a sec-
tion 3(b) event, in other words, an event that compelled the 
appellant to fl ee his or her country because it seriously dis-
rupted or disturbed the public order. In its decision, when re-
viewing the appellant’s claim, the Appeal Board simply stated 
that the appellant was a Tutsi, who was forced to fl ee when 
the genocide reached his village. Th e author suggests that 
when the appellant arrived in South Africa, in terms of both 
the OAU and the Refugee Convention defi nitions, he would 
have qualifi ed for refugee status. Not only did the Rwandan 
genocide qualify as an OAU event, but because the appellant 
was a Tutsi, he was specifi cally persecuted due to his race or 
tribe, as contemplated in the Refugee Convention defi nition. 
Th e ten-year delay in fi nalizing this asylum seeker’s claim, 
led to the Appeal Board dismissing his claim based on a lack 
of a forward-looking assessment of risk, without taking into 
consideration possible circumstances of section 5(2) of the 
Refugee Act. Th us, the Appeal Board, having framed the rea-
sons why the appellant fl ed his country to be a section 3(b) 
reason only, may have erred in its decision.
Two additional decisions of the Appeal Board examined 
by the author further highlight the signifi cance of the for-
ward-looking assessment of risk as discussed above. Both 
these Appeal decisions involved Burundian nationals. Th e 
fi rst of these, decided on 6 May 2004, found that the appel-
lant, who fl ed his country in 1998, was a refugee because 
“in the circumstances … the change(s) in Burundi have not 
been shown to be durable.”48 Th is decision was reached aft er 
the Board reviewed country-of-origin information which 
showed that despite a ceasefi re in Burundi, fi ghting was 
still taking place in the country, hence a durable change of 
circumstances could not be established. In this regard, the 
Appeal Board took into consideration Hathaway’s following 
position on this point: “Th is condition (durability) is in keep-
ing with the forward-looking nature of the refugee defi nition 
and avoids the disruption of protection in circumstances 
where safety may be only a momentary aberration.”49
Nearly three years later, however, in an Appeal Board de-
cision dated 4 April 2007, the case of a Burundian appellant, 
who fl ed his country in 1997 when the civil war was rife in 
his country, was dismissed due to country-of-origin reports 
that indicated that “the conditions in Burundi are changing 
for the better.”50 In this case, the Board found that “there 
have been no serious recurrences of the widespread armed 
confl ict or serious human rights abuses that were widely re-
ported in 2004 and that section 3(b) of the Refugees Act 130 
of 1998 is no longer applicable,”51 hence it was safe for appel-
lant to return to his country at this time.
Th e remaining Appeal Board decisions that the author re-
viewed relate to specifi c elements of the OAU or section 3(b) 
refugee defi nition. In this regard, the author examined two 
Appeal Board decisions in which the phrase “place of habitu-
al residence” was considered. In Appeal Board decision num-
ber 378/05, the appeal was upheld and refugee status granted 
to a female national of the DRC. Th e appellant was living and 
working in Uvira, and in September 2002 fl ed the generalized 
violence in that area, moving to Moba, another town in the 
DRC, where she remained for the next nine months. When 
the fi ghting reached Moba, she fl ed the country, eventually 
arriving in South Africa. She claimed she could not return to 
her country of origin, due to the ongoing fi ghting in the east-
ern part of the DRC. In this case, the Board stated that the 
principle issue to be decided was whether the appellant was 
compelled to leave her place of habitual residence in order to 
seek refuge elsewhere, in other words whether section 3(b) of 
the Refugees Act was applicable. In answering this question, 
the Board decided the following:
Th e last location where the appellant “resided” in the DRC was 
Moba where she had fl ed to aft er leaving Mulonge village in 
Uvira. Th e Board has reservations whether Moba can be seen 
as the appellant’s [place of] habitual residence and fi nds that it 
was not whether or not she was compelled to leave it. Th e Board 
fi nds that Uvira was the appellant’s place of habitual residence 
which she was compelled to leave in order to seek refuge else-
where. Th e appellant’s evidence indicates that she was compelled 
to leave her place of habitual residence due to events seriously 
disturbing or disrupting public order i.e. the fi ghting taking 
place in the eastern DRC and specifi cally Uvira.52
Th e Board’s above interpretation relating to the appellant’s 
place of habitual residence is, in essence, consistent with M. 
Rankin’s comments relating to incidents of delay between the 
time when a refugee is compelled to leave his or her place of 
habitual residence due to an OAU event and the time he or 
she arrives in the country of asylum. During this period, an 
individual may be internally displaced and thus have to take 
up residence in various secondary locations before fi nally 
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fl eeing the country. Whereas within the context of the 1951 
Refugee Convention defi nition, a delay in taking fl ight may 
aff ect the asylum seeker’s credibility,53 in terms of the OAU 
defi nition, a delay goes to the issue of whether someone has 
actually been compelled from their habitual residence.54 
Rankin elaborates on this issue further as follows:
Th e short answer to the delay problem may be found in the con-
cept of a continuing compulsion. Th at is the idea that having 
once fl ed from her place of habitual residence an asylum seeker 
will continue to be compelled so long as the displacement can be 
casually linked to an initial triggering event.55
In this same Appeal Board decision, the Board also con-
fi rms its cautious position taken with regard to the IFA, as 
described above. More specifi cally, in this regard the Board 
states:
Th e fi nal question which the Board has to consider is whether 
in cases where section 3(b) of the Act is applicable, the inter-
nal relocation alternative can be applied or not. In this instance 
Counsel for the appellant has argued that it cannot be applied. 
Th e Board has certain reservations but for the purpose of this 
decision will go along with [Counsel’s] argument. In the circum-
stances the appellant’s appeal must succeed.56
In Refugee Appeal Board decision number 415/05, the 
Board again considered the issue of “place of habitual resi-
dence” when it dismissed the appellant’s claim. In this 
case, the appellant, a national from the DRC, was living in 
Lubumbashi, but was on a fi shing trip with friends during 
school holidays in Moba. When appellant and his friends 
received news that rebels were coming, they attempted to re-
turn home to Lubumbashi but they encountered government 
troops in the town of Pweto. Th e soldiers accused the appel-
lant and his friends of being rebels and then forced the appel-
lant to fi ght with them against the rebels. Shortly thereaft er, 
the appellant was able to escape in an attack by the rebels 
on the army soldiers, and fl ed the country, eventually arriv-
ing in South Africa. Th e appellant stated that when he fl ed, 
he was afraid to return to Lubumbashi because he would be 
accused of being a rebel and that furthermore he could not 
return to the DRC because of the war situation in the eastern 
Congo. Th e Board found that the appellant “did not habitu-
ally reside at Moba or at Pweto in the lower eastern part of 
the DRC”57 because he and his friends were there on vaca-
tion. Th e Board therefore concluded that “it is clear that sec-
tion 3(b) of the Refugees Act, 1998, has no application here 
as the appellant, and his friends, were not compelled to leave 
their place of habitual residence to seek refuge elsewhere.”58 
Th e Board furthermore decided that the appellant’s assertion 
that he would be considered a rebel was implausible, and that 
Lubumbashi is under government control and according to 
country information is safe from fi ghting. Accordingly, the 
appellant was denied refugee status. Th is decision demon-
strates an appropriate analysis on the part of the Appeal 
Board regarding the application of the OAU refugee defi n-
ition. It furthermore reveals a situation in which the Appeal 
Board properly assesses an appellant’s claim from the view-
point of both the Refugee Convention and the OAU refugee 
defi nitions.
Lastly, the fi nal Appeal Board decision obtained by the 
author for the purposes of this paper focuses on the Board’s 
specifi c interpretation of the meaning of a disruption or dis-
turbance of the public order. In Refugee Appeal Board deci-
sion number 1433/06, the Appeal Board dismissed the ap-
peal of a Nigerian asylum seeker based on its interpretation 
of this aspect of the 3(b) defi nition. In this case, the appellant 
claimed that, as a Christian, he was fearful of the fi ghting 
taking place in his country between Christians and Muslims, 
although “he was unable to state exactly where the fi ght-
ing was taking place.”59 In its decision, the Board reviewed 
country of origin information on Nigeria, which confi rmed 
that “there were incidents of violence between Muslims and 
Christians between 2001 and 2004 mainly in the Plateau 
and Kano states … [and] in reaction to the religious vio-
lence, President Obassanjo declared a state of emergency.”60 
Furthermore, another report confi rmed that as a result of 
violent incidents between Christians and Muslims during 
February 2006 in the city of Onitsha, from where the appel-
lant hailed, the “state governor deployed 2000 policemen on 
the streets and appealed for calm.” According to these reports, 
the Board concluded that “the government [of Nigeria] is tak-
ing an active role in preventing and/or stopping the violent 
incidents between Christians and Muslims”61 and that the 
“government is doing all it can to prevent or control violent 
incidents between the two religious groups.” In turning to 
the application of section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, the Board 
concluded that the defi nition does not apply in this case, as 
events disrupting or disturbing the public order implies “that 
the government is no longer in control,”62 which according 
to the Board “is not the case in Nigeria at all, [since] the gov-
ernment is fi rmly in control.”63
Th is interpretation of the Appeal Board of “events serious-
ly disturbing or disrupting public order” is seemingly a nar-
row one. A government’s attempts, no matter how genuine, 
to suppress or subdue serious disruptions or disturbances of 
public order should not be the litmus test for the applica-
tion of this defi nition, since generalized violence and massive 
human rights violations may nonetheless take place, thereby 
compelling someone to take fl ight. Th e eff ectiveness of a 
government’s attempts must therefore be considered as well. 
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While the above case involved a clearly weak refugee claim, 
in that the appellant could not even point to specifi c events 
that compelled him to take fl ight, the Board in this decision 
nevertheless demonstrated a restrictive analysis, as nowhere 
did it question the ability of the Nigerian government to con-
trol the unrest that had occurred. Th e following decision of 
the Appeal Board reviewed by the author is, however, more 
instructive on this point.
In the course of her employment, the author has come 
across only one other Appeal Board decision, which provides 
further insight into the Board’s interpretation of section 3(b) 
of the Refugees Act, and which complements the above deci-
sion. In Refugee Appeal Board decision number 729/06, in 
which the Board dismissed the appeal of a Burundian asy-
lum seeker, the Board stated the following:
Where law and order has broken and the government is unwill-
ing or unable to protect its citizens, it can be said that there are 
events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order. To deter-
mine when a disturbance had taken place involves weighing the 
degree and intensity of the conduct complained of against the 
degree and nature of the peace which can be expected to prevail 
in a given place at a given time. Th e test should be objective.64
Th is quote provides some clarity as to the Board’s inter-
pretation of “events seriously disrupting public order,” as here 
the Appeal Board refers to the necessary ability of a govern-
ment to protect its citizens in the face of an OAU or section 
3(b) event. Accordingly, it can be stated that the Board takes 
the position that only when an asylum seeker’s government is 
“unwilling or unable to protect” its citizens in the face of law 
and order having broken down, does this constitute a section 
3(b) event. What is unclear or undefi ned, however, is the pre-
cise meaning of “law and order breaking down.”
Conclusions
In light of the continuing trend that has seen the narrowing 
of the scope of application of the Refugee Convention def-
inition, resulting in the denial of protection to people who 
require safety for their lives outside of their country of origin 
or nationality, the expanded OAU refugee defi nition rep-
resents an “opposite trend [and] is what comprises its true 
value for refugee jurisprudence at a global level.”65 Whether 
or not in the South African context this is the case has been 
the focus of this paper; the question being whether South 
Africa is applying the expanded refugee defi nition sens-
ibly and as such providing protection to those persons who 
may otherwise not qualify for refugee status in terms of the 
Refugee Convention defi nition. Th e answer to this question 
is a particularly diffi  cult one. At the outset, assessing whether 
the defi nition is properly applied is critically hampered by 
the fact that the precise legal meaning of the OAU refugee 
defi nition is non-existent, and that comparative jurispru-
dence from other jurisdictions on the continent is not read-
ily available.
Turning to South Africa’s asylum determination proced-
ure, one can conclude that, at fi rst instance, the Department’s 
reliance on the OAU refugee defi nition in the form of a prima 
facie procedure based on “white lists” or “refugee generating 
countries” is an inadequate approach, in that it may include 
generalized and hence incorrect assumptions about what 
constitutes an OAU or section 3(b) event and a lack of appro-
priate consideration of the other elements of the defi nition. 
Additionally, as there is currently no offi  cial mass infl ux situ-
ation in the country, such group determination violates the 
Refugees Act, which clearly provides for an individualized 
refugee status determination for each applicant. In examin-
ing only the objective conditions of a country, the RSDOs 
may also potentially disregard the subjective elements of an 
individual applicant’s claim. In this regard, as van Beek cor-
rectly asserts, “a [refugee] determination procedure, which 
is only based on country information, neglects the fact that 
refugees also come from countries perceived to be safe … 
[and] violates the principle of non-discrimination, written 
down in the South African Constitution and the UN and 
OAU Conventions.”66
Th is research concludes that, in terms of its application 
of the OAU Convention’s refugee defi nition, it would appear 
that Department of Home Aff airs offi  cials are not suffi  ciently 
trained to apply the defi nition properly and that the asylum 
process itself, given the signifi cant pressures it faces, does 
not allow for this to take place. Specifi c training on the non-
exclusive application of the section 3(b) refugee defi nition 
should be provided, as well as a concerted eff ort to promote 
the expansion of the concept of refugee protection to all per-
sons who do not have individualized claims of persecution in 
their countries of origin.
With regard to South Africa’s Refugee Appeal Board deci-
sions, a more considered and measured approach to the ap-
plication of the OAU or section 3(b) refugee defi nition has 
been observed. From the limited number of decisions re-
viewed, it appears as though the Appeal Board is faithfully 
applying its mind to the numerous interpretative issues raised 
by the OAU refugee defi nition, and the Board’s application of 
the expanded refugee defi nition is reasoned, although fairly 
limited or narrow in its scope. However, it may not be until 
such time as an Appeal Board’s decision involving its inter-
pretation of the expanded refugee defi nition is challenged on 
judicial review to the South African High Court that more 
meaningful jurisprudence will develop in this regard.
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